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THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE 
COURT'S ERROR OF REFUSING TO SEND THE JURY FOR FURTHER 
DELIBERATIONS WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT GENERAL DAMAGES 
MUST BE AWARDED, 
If a jury awards special damages, general damages must be awarded. Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971). When a jury awards special 
damages, but no general damages, the court must instruct them on their error and allow them 
to deliberate further on an award of general damages. Id. 
Defendants do not address or dispute this elementary legal concept. Instead, they argue 
that the "invited error doctrine" prevents Sergio Pruneda from claiming the trial court erred. 
Plaintiffs submitted and the Court gave MUJI Instruction 27.1 verbatim. Defendants 
claim the plaintiffs thereby invited the jury to commit error due to the "if any" language 
contained in the instruction. This Instruction, adopted from the prior JIFU instruction 90.1, 
has been used for many years, and was in use when our Supreme Court decided Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., supra. This Instruction is merely a preliminary instruction on 
damages. It relates to the general notion of awarding damages of any kind. It does not tell 
the jury that it can award special damages, but no general damages. It does not differentiate 
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between special or general damages. It applies only to the question of whether any damages 
are to be awarded. 
The Instruction does not overrule the holding in the Langton case that an award of 
special damages for medical expenses mandates an award of general damages. The Court in 
Langton said if the jury awards special damages for medical expenses, but fails to award 
general damages, objection to the failure must be made prior to the jury being excused so the 
error can be corrected at the trial and not the appellate level. See, Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 
75 (Utah App. 2006). 
The whole basis for the invited error doctrine is the concept that one cannot stand mute 
and allow the trial court to commit error, and then complain of the error on appeal. State v. 
Geukeuzian, 86 P.3d 742 (Utah 2004). (The invited error doctrine is intended to give the Trial 
Court the opportunity to address the error); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1996). (Invited error rule serves purpose of fortifying the policy that the trial court should 
have the first opportunity to correct an error). The invited error doctrine does not apply to this 
case. 
Langton is in essence an invited error case. The Supreme Court concluded it is error 
for a jury to award special damages and no general damages. However, the Supreme Court 
upheld the verdict because counsel did not point out the error to the trial court when it could 
have fixed the problem before releasing the jury. 
Langton teaches us that in a case where the jury awards special damages, but no 
general damages: 
2 
The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been 
returned is for the Trial Court to require the jury to return for further 
deliberation. 491 R2d at 491. 
None of the cases cited by Defendant involve a situation where the failure of the jury 
to award general damages was brought to the attention of the trial court in time to correct the 
error before discharging the jury. 
The proper procedure is to send the jury back out to make an award of general 
damages. Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75,79 (Utah App. 2006); Langton v. International 
Transport, Inc., supra. See Uta-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980); Cohn v. J.C Penney Company, Inc., 537 P. 2d 306 (Utah 1975). In Baldaras, this court 
said: 
As a general rule, it is improper for a jury to award special damages without awarding 
any general damages. In Langton v. International Transport Inc., the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "it must be conceded that if plaintiff were entitled to an award of 
special damages, he was entitled to be compensated... for pain and suffering." Thus, 
the trial court in this case correctly resubmitted the verdict form after the jury awarded 
special damages but no general damages. 138 P.3d at 79 (citations omitted). 
Even if the jury was confused by the instruction, the Court had the opportunity and the 
obligation to correct the error before the jury was discharged. 
Plaintiffs asked the trial court to send the jury back out. The Court's refusal was 
reversible error. Id.; Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra. 
The trial court erred by overruling plaintiffs' objection to the failure to award general 
damages. It further erred by releasing the jury over plaintiffs' objection that they must award 
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general damages. These errors were substantial and prejudicial because Sergio Pruneda was 
denied his right to recover general damages. 
POINT II 
AN AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES EXCEEDING $3.000,00 ENTITLES A 
PLAINTIFF TO A SUBSTANTIAL GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD, 
Plaintiff has presented to this Court a legal issue that, so far as counsel has been able 
to determine, has never been ruled upon by this Court. Plaintiffs' argument, simply stated, 
is that an award of special damages, in excess of the statutory threshold of $3,000.00 
established by Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-22-309 (Supp. 2001), should entitle a party to 
a substantial award of general damages. 
Citing cases from other jurisdictions, defendants claim there is an exception to the rule 
that an award of special damages requires a general damage award. Appellee's Brief at 17. 
They cite Utah cases where general damage awards of $1.00 have been upheld. E.g., Tingey 
v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999); Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 
1039 (Utah 1981). 
The cases cited by defendants in their brief do not, however, address the argument 
being made by plaintiffs that an award of special damages, in excess of Utah's statutory 
threshold of $3,000.00, should entitle a party to a substantial award of general damages. 
In Tingey v. Christensen, supra, The Supreme Court upheld the jury's award of 
$ 1,459.92 in special damages and an award of $ 1.00 in nominal damages. The Court stated: 
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The jury returned a verdict of $1,459.92 in special damages, an amount equal to 
Tingey's emergency room expenses on December 30. The jury initially awarded 
nothing for Tingey's pain and suffering in general damages; however, because it had 
awarded special damages, the trial Judge instructed it to deliberate again and make 
some award for pain and suffering. The jury redeliberated and awarded only $1 in 
general damages. Because defendants in auto accidents are only liable for a plaintiffs 
personal injuries in excess of $3,000, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, and because 
the verdict was less than that amount, the trial court entered judgment for the 
Christensens. 1999 UT 68, f 5. 
Because the special damage award in Tingey did not meet the statutory threshold, the 
Tingey case has no value as precedent in this case. Here an award of special damages in 
excess of the statutory threshold deserves more than a nominal general damages award. The 
special damages award in this case were $4,762.07. 
Likewise, the issue raised herein was not discussed in Martineau v. Anderson, supra. 
In Martineau, the final general damages award exceeded the special damages award. The 
Court held that the award could not be challenged on appeal because there was no objection 
to the award prior to the release of the jury. 
Not so in this case. Plaintiffs raised the issue of the jury's failure to award general 
damages prior to the release of the jury. Plaintiffs pointed out the jury's failure to award 
general damages, and then presented a proposed instruction to be given when the court sent 
the jury for further deliberations. This issue was preserved for appeal and needs to be 
decided. 
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In Kepley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 1992), the Colorado Court of Appeals held 
that a substantial award for medical care for injuries suffered over a period of time requires 
a general damage award for pain and suffering damages. The Court said: 
Thus, although it may have been entirely proper for the jury to have rejected plaintiffs 
evidence and to have found no injuries, losses, or damages, we cannot reconcile its 
award of $3000 for treatment for chronic pain with a finding of no pain and suffering. 
843P.2datl37. 
An award of only nominal damages for pain and suffering is, in essence, a finding of 
"no pain and suffering" and an award based upon such a finding. The jury decided Sergio 
Pruneda suffered sufficiently serious pain and injury to warrant an award of $4,762.07 in 
medical treatment. Failure to award appropriate general damages cannot be reconciled with 
such a large award for medical expenses. The jury should have been instructed to consider a 
general damage award of some kind. Langton, Supra; Baldaras, supra, 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) allows a suit for general damages to be 
maintained only in cases involving death, dismemberment, permanent disability or 
impairment, disfigurement, or where medical expenses exceed $3,000. Thus, by definition, 
only in cases involving significant pain and suffering is a plaintiff allowed to sue for general 
damages. By statute, only in serious cases can a suit be brought for general damages. To 
allow a jury to discount these serious injuries by awarding nominal damages in cases where 
the threshold has been met is simply not reconcilable with the idea that the "statutory 
threshold" defines a "serious" injury. 
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This is an issue of first impression in Utah. However, in Langton v. International 
Transport, Inc., supra, the Utah Supreme Court, in dictum, said: 
[I]t must be conceded that if plaintiff were entitled to an award of special damages, he 
was entitled to be compensated, under the evidence, for pain and suffering . . . " Id. 
at 1214. 
Indeed, such is the rule in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kepley v. Kim, supra; 
Shewry v. Heuer, 121 N.W. 2d 529 (Iowa 1963). This court should establish a rule that 
injuries sufficient to exceed the statutorily mandated threshold established by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 31A-22-309 (Supp. 2001) entitle a victim to more than a nominal award of general 
damages. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY 
OF PR, McCLEAN. 
Defendants argue the trial court properly precluded Dr. McClean from testifying about 
the causation of the plaintiffs' injuries he treated. In addition, it properly prevented him from 
testifying from his records. The trial court then gave a curative instruction regarding the prior 
testimony from his records, and required that the medical records be redacted. 
Earlier, the court granted defendants' motion in limine to prevent Dr. McClean from 
giving opinions because plaintiffs had not filed an expert report for Dr. McClean pursuant to 
Rule 26(a)(3)(B). 
The trial court erred. A treating physician doesn't need to prepare an expert's report 
in order to give his opinions reached while providing care and treatment to his patients. 
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Defendants rely upon Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 (Utah App.2006), and the 
holding in Thomas v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1996). Their reliance 
is misplaced. The Youngblood case is inapposite, and the Thomas case has been modified. 
Pete v. Youngblood was a medical malpractice case. The facts are different than the 
present case, and the opinion regarding a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report, says that such a report is 
required where an opinion on "the standard of care" is rendered. Pete v. Youngblood, 141 
P.2d at 634. While the opinion states that a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report is not always required 
from a treating physician, it does not address when such report is or is not required. That was 
not the issue in the Youngblood case because no Rule 26 report was filed. 
In the present case, plaintiffs designated Dr. McClean, Under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), as a 
treating physician who would render expert testimony regarding his care and treatment of 
plaintiffs. The majority of Courts, including the Massachusetts Court which modified the 
holding in Thomas v. Consolidated Rail Corp., supra, hold that a treating physician may give 
testimony as to treatment, causation, prognosis, and impairment, when such opinions are 
formed during the course of his treatment. E.g., Garcia v. City of Springfield Police Dept, 230 
F.R.D. 247, 249 (D. Mass. 2005); Washington v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 
197 F.R.D. 439,442 (D.Colo 2000); Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, 172 F.R.D. 415,416 
(D. Hawaii 1997); Piper v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. 173,175 (D. Nev. 1997); Glass 
v. Crimmins Transfer Co., 299 R Supp. 2d 878, 888 (CD. 111. 2004); Sprague v. Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co., Ill F.R.D. 78, 81 ( D.N.H. 1998); Salas v. U.S., 165 F.R.D. 31, 33 
(W.D.N.Y. 1995). See, Note, Treating Physicians: Fact Witnesses or Retained Expert 
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Witnesses in Disguise? Finding a Place for Treating Physician Opinions in the Iowa 
Discovery Rules, 48 Drake L. Rev., 719, 727-31 (2000). 
The reason that expert reports are not required from a treating physician is clearly set 
out in Sprague v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra. The court said: 
A principle purpose of Rule 26(a)(2) is to permit a "reasonable opportunity to prepare 
for effective cross examination and . . . arrange for expert testimony from other 
witnesses." The unretained experts, who formed opinions from pre-litigation 
observation invariably have files from which any competent trial attorney can 
effectively cross examine. The retained expert, who under the former interrogatory 
rule frequently provided sketchy and vague answers, has no such files and is thus 
required to provide the report to enable effective cross examination. This reading puts 
unretained experts, because of their historical file, and retained experts, because of the 
required report, on equal footing for cross examination purposes. 177 F.R.D. at 81 
(citations omitted). 
In the present case, Dr. McClean indeed had historical files of his treatment of all of 
the plaintiffs. These files, with his opinions, were provided to defendants in discovery. 
Defendants had them when they deposed Dr. McClean. All of the information needed for an 
effective cross examination at trial was available to defendants in discovery. Their claims in 
their Motion in Limine that they would be prejudiced if Dr. McClean were allowed to testify 
about opinions formed during his treatment of the plaintiffs is totally without merit. As the 
Sprague Court observed, "unretained experts, who formed opinions from pre-litigation 
observation invariably have files from which any competent trial attorney can effectively 
cross examine." Id. The claim of prejudice from not having a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report from 
Dr. McClean has no merit. 
As the Court in Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, supra, said: 
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[o]pinions of Plaintiff s treating physicians that are based upon information acquired 
in the course of treatment of plaintiff may be offered and do not trigger the report 
requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 172 F.R.D. at 417. 
The case of Thomas v. Consolidated Rail Corpf supra, was cited by this court in Pete 
v. Youngblood, supra, for the proposition that in order to determine if an expert need be 
identified before trial, Rule 26 focuses on the substance of the testimony, and not on the status 
of the witness. Defendants argue extensively in their brief that Thomas supports their position. 
However, they admit Garcia v. City of Springfield Police DepL, supra, modifies Thomas by 
holding that a treating physician can testify as to causation and prognosis. The Garcia Court 
said: 
The common rule distilled from the above decisions is that so long as the expert care-
provider's testimony about causation and prognosis is based on personal knowledge 
and on observations obtained during the course of care and treatment, and he or she is 
not specially retained in connection with the litigation or for trial, a Rule 26 expert 
report is not necessary. 230 F.R.D. at 249 (emphasis added). 
The majority of federal courts follow this rule and allow testimony as to causation and 
prognosis from a treating physician when the opinions were the result of the care and 
treatment of the patient. In this case, Dr. McClean formed his opinions regarding the cause 
of the injuries treated during his treatment of the plaintiffs. He recorded opinions about 
causation in his medical records. The trial court ordered them to be redacted. 
The situation presented by this case is the exact situation where a majority of federal 
courts have ruled that a treating physician can testify and give his opinions without an expert 
report. Garcia v. City of Springfield Police Dept,supra; Washington v. Arapahoe County 
Dept. of Social Services, supra: Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, supra; Piper v. 
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Harnischfeger Corp., supra; Glass v. Crimmins Transfer Co., supra; Sprague v. Liberty 
Mutuallns. Co., supra; Salas v. U.S., supra. See, Note, Treating Physicians: Fact Witnesses 
or Retained Expert Witnesses in Disguise? Finding a Place for Treating Physician Opinions 
in the Iowa Discovery Rules, supra at 727-31 (majority of federal courts follow this rule). 
All of the errors claimed by plaintiffs at Point III of their brief flowed from the trial 
court's misunderstanding of the requirements of Rule 26. It was error to grant defendants' 
Motion in Limine. It was error to prohibit Dr. McClean from testifying about causation. It was 
error to prevent Dr. McClean from reading his records. It was error to give a curative 
instruction to prior testimony. And, it was error to require redaction of Dr. McClean's records. 
Defendants argue if the court erred, the error was harmless. This claim is incredulous. 
The effect of the court's numerous rulings produced a picture for the jury that the treatment 
of the Pruneda children was not related to injuries received in the collision. The jury was told 
to disregard Dr. McClean's testimony that he released the children from his care for injuries 
received in the collision. It's no surprise the jury denied compensation for Dr. McClean's 
treatment. The requirement to redact all such references from his medical records, before they 
could go to the jury, simply compounded the error. 
The defendants can't be heard to say these rulings did not affect the outcome of the 
case. When there is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice resulted from a court's 
rulings, the error is not harmless. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992); Ewell & Son, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 493 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1972). Where there is a reasonable 
likelihood that absent the error, the result would have been different, the case must be 
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reversed. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992); Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, if the jury heard Dr. McClean's testimony as proffered, with opinions as 
to causation, it is likely the jury would have awarded the cost of his treatment as damages. 
POINT IV 
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANCE WAS INADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 702, 
A. There is no foundation for the testimony of Dr. Paul France 
Defendants claim Dr. France's testimony is admissible because he claims his 
methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community. Relying on State v Clayton, 
646 P.2d 712 (Utah 1982), defendants argue that once Dr. France utters the magic words "his 
method is based on generally accepted scientific principles," plaintiffs cannot question 
whether or not this is correct. That is, the issue of "general acceptance" is established simply 
by their expert saying so. 
More enlightened cases, decided after Clayton, debunk defendants' argument. There 
is a duty on the person proposing an expert witness to establish not only that the methodology 
is reliable, but that the expert has sufficient information to apply his methodology. State v. 
Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah App 2001). The Mead court said: 
In deciding whether evidence is admissible under rule 702, Utah courts follow a three-
prong test: (1) whether "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's 
testimony are inherently reliable," State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,641 (Utah 1996), (2) 
whether "the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to 
the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts," id. (footnote omitted), 
and (3) whether the evidence is admissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 27 P.3d at 1126. 
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When, as here, there is a plausible claim that the testimony to be admitted is based upon a 
"novel technique," the inherent reliability test of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1989), must be applied. Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638 (Utah 2001); Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 
252 (Utah App.2005), cert, denied, 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 2006). The Haupt Court said: 
A reliability standard is necessary because [w]hile often helpful, scientific testimony 
also has the potential to overawe and confuse, and even to be misused for that purpose. 
Consequently, jurisprudential history reveals a consistent attempt to ensure the 
reliability and helpfulness of evidence while allowing a maximum of relevant 
information to flow to the finder of fact. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115,56, 61 
P.3d 1068. A Rimmasch analysis is "inapplicable where there is no plausible claim that 
the type of expert testimony offered by the prosecution was based on novel scientific 
principles or techniques." Id. at 59 (quotations omitted). If, however, the reliability of 
the underlying principles offered by the expert can be reasonably questioned, judicial 
notice is not appropriate and the party offering the testimony has the burden of 
establishing its inherent reliability. See id. Testimony not found to be inherently 
reliable may not be admitted. 131 P.3d at 258. 
In this case, plaintiffs have presented a plausible claim that the methodology employed by Dr. 
France to reach his speed estimates is totally unreliable. The methodology has never been 
shown to produce accurate results. See, Appellants' Brief at Point IV. The Haupt Court 
speaks of a consistent attempt to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence because of a 
potential to overawe and confuse a jury. Rimmasch speaks of: 
"[T]he tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide the critical 
issues and simply adopt the judgment of the expert despite an inability to accurately 
appraise the validity of the underlying science." State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. 
Because juries tend to place so much credence on testimony of an "expert witness," our 
courts regularly address the need to assure that evidence offered by experts is reliable. Id.; 
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Haupt v. Heaps, supra; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002); State v. Crosby, 927 
P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1980). 
Dr. France's methodology of looking at photographs of damage, and estimates of 
damage, and then comparing them to crash test data to arrive at a speed estimate is not 
reliable. Once the reliability of the methodology is called into question, the burden of 
showing reliability and scientific acceptance as a method of determining speed at impact is 
transferred to the party offering the witness. 
To meet this burden, the offering party must be required to offer more than the expert's 
own opinion that his methodology is accepted in the scientific community. The offering party 
must establish that the methodology actually works. 
When a company puts a health care product on the market and claims it is capable of 
producing certain results if used, the FDA requires the company to back up their claims with 
reliable test data. It cannot simply establish reliability by its own statements. 
Should the courts be any less demanding? This court should clarify this principle for 
the trial courts. The bottom line of admissibility of expert testimony must always be 
reliability. When challenged, the offering party must be required to show that the 
methodology works. 
Dr. France has been unable to produce evidence of a single study that has validated his 
methodology. 
Defendants argue they don't need to establish reliability because Dr. France provides 
it by saying he relied on materials reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. Appellees' 
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Brief at Point IV. However, defendants do admit that if there is a plausible claim the 
testimony is based on novel techniques, a reliability analysis is warranted. Id. At pp. 34-35. 
They simply claim there is no "plausible" claim the methodology is "novel" so the court 
doesn't need to look at reliability. 
B. Dr. France had insufficient data to apply his Methodology 
Dr. France lacked the necessary information to determine the impact speed of the 
Durango into the Pruneda car because he lacked reliable information about the damage caused 
to the third car in the collision. 
Defendants argue that because Dr. France relied the data described at page 36 of their 
Brief, his conclusions are somehow admissible even though by his own testimony he was 
missing significant data about the damage to the Pruneda and Perez vehicles and how far they 
moved in the collision. See Appellants' Brief at 39-42. 
Dr. France claims his methodology is based upon basic physics principles involving 
conservation of momentum and crush analysis. R. 774 at 119-121. Momentum equations are 
very straight-forward. The energy created by the impact speed ot the Durango must equal at 
least the amount of energy necessary to cause the damage to the Durango, the Pruneda 
LeBaron, and the Perez Nova. If both the impact speed and the amount of energy dissipated 
are unknown, the calculation cannot be done. R. 774 at 144, 222. Dr. France said he uses 
crush analysis to determine impact speed so he can calculate the forces involved in the 
collision. R. 774 at 139-150,222-23. However, to do a proper crush analysis, the total extent 
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of the crush to all vehicles must be known. R. 774 at 144. If there is no information on one 
of the cars and incomplete information on another, he can only guess. 
The problem with Dr. France's speed estimates offered at trial in this case is that his 
speed estimates have essentially the same chance of being right as a determination of the 
number of oranges in three baskets when he can't see the third basket. 
Even in situations where actual crush to a vehicle involved in a collision can be 
measured, experts have problems estimating an impact speed to begin their calculations. 
When the cars cannot be examined and experts attempt to accurately estimate the crush from 
photographs of the amount of crush, and then determine vehicle speed, the ability to do so 
accurately is questionable.1 
Dr. France made many guesses in order to reach his conclusions. R. 774 at 144-45, 
222-23. His ability to"guess" was further compromised by having no information on the 
Nova. 
Dr. France had no reliable information on the amount of damage to the Nova. He 
lacked information as to the total amount of damage to the Pruneda LeBaron. He knows there 
was frame damage to the LeBaron, but not how much. He does not know how far the Nova 
was pushed by the collision and whether it was uphill, downhill, or on a level surface. 
lThe study introduced at trial during the foundational testimony of Dr. France as 
exhibit 13 at pp.9-10, established that there is a wide variation among experts in estimated 
speed when they try to estimate speeds involved in a collision using damage photographs. 
This inability to accurately determine speeds from crush is one of the reasons the 
methodology of Dr. France is suspect in its ability to allow an accurate speed estimate. 
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There is simply so much data that he did not have, and had to fill in with guesses, that 
there is no way his final conclusion could be anything other than a guess. The bottom line is 
that a guess is not admissible as an expert opinion. Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 
1987) 
Defendant argues that Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va 151,475 S.E. 2d 261 (1996), has 
no application to this case because the evidence rules in Virginia are not the same as those in 
Utah. This argument misses the true significance of the opinion as applied to the facts of this 
case. In Tittsworth, as here, a similar methodology was employed to determine impact speed. 
A careful reading of the case indicates that the reason the Virginia Court found the method 
unreliable was because the expert, as in this case, lacked much of the information necessary 
to make the calculations fact specific to the collision at issue. 
We have the same problem in this case. Dr. France said he had carried out three-
vehicle test collisions, but never on similar vehicles. Barrier tests and vehicle specifications 
only have meaning if you know the extent of damage to all three cars. Like the expert in 
Tittsworth, Dr. France did not have all of the damage information necessary to apply his 
methodology, even assuming the methodology produced accurate results. 
C. Conclusion 
Defendant failed to establish that Dr. France's methodology works or that it is capable 
of producing an accurate estimate of impact speed. Even if the method were reliable, by his 
own admission, the data necessary to make the calculations was missing and had to be added 
by guesswork. Such opinions are simply not admissible. Kofford v. Flora, supra; Tittsworth 
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v. Robinson, supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra; Haupt v. Heaps, supra; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 
supra; State v. Crosby, supra; Phillips v. Jackson, supra. 
POINT V 
PR, JAYNE CLARK LACKED THE EXPERTISE TO ALLOW HER TO TESTIFY 
REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE AND TREATMENT FOR A 
CHIROPRACTIC PHYSICIAN, 
Defendants claim that Dr. Clark had the knowledge and background to allow her to 
give opinions on the necessity, propriety, and extent of the chiropractic treatment received by 
plaintiffs because she knows the standard of care for treatment of spinal problems. 
Defendants' Brief at 39. They cite Burton v. Youngblood, 111 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985), and 
argue that a practitioner of one school (Dr. Clark, a Physical Medicine Specialist) is not 
prohibited from testifying against a member of another school (a chiropractor), if the 
testifying doctor has sufficient knowledge and is familiar with the standard of care practiced 
by the other specialty. Id. 
Citing Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307,1310 (Utah 1993), defendants argue Dr. Clark 
can testify regarding treatment provided by a practitioner from another school if: 
1. She is knowledgeable about the standard of care for chiropractors; or 
2. If the standard of care is the same for her specialty and Chiropractors. Id. 
Generally, a physician practicing in one specialty cannot testify regarding the propriety of the 
care rendered by a practitioner in a different specialty if it is not established that the standard 
of care, i.e., the theory and methodology of treatment, is the same in both specialties; or the 
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testifying physician has sufficient training, experience and background in the theory and 
methodology of treatment practiced in the other specialty (standard of care) to allow the 
expert to give an opinion on the issue of whether the other practitioner gave appropriate 
treatment pursuant to the tenets of his specially. Burton v. Youngblood, supra at 248-49; 
Arnold v. Curtis, supra atl310; Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1994) ; 
Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, there is no evidence that the standard of care, or the theory and 
methodology of treatment, is the same for chiropractic physicians as for a medical doctor 
trained in physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Clark didn't say otherwise. No one did. 
Counsel merely argues that they are similar and both treat the same kinds of injuries, 
and that physical medicine and chiropractic "overlap." Defendants Brief at 40. Absent a 
showing that the theory and methods of chiropractic treatment are identical to the theory and 
methods of treatment in her own specialty, Dr. Clark does not meet this exception to the rule 
established in Burton v. Youngblood, supra at 248. 
Thus, the only way that Dr. Clark could possibly be qualified to testify regarding the 
necessity, or lack thereof, for the chiropractic care rendered to the plaintiffs in this case, is if 
she has sufficient knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care and treatment 
commonly practiced by chiropractors. Martin v. Mott, supra at 339; Burton v. Youngblood, 
supra at 248-49; Dikeou v. Osbornt supra at 947; Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94,97 (Utah 
1990). 
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Defendants never established that Dr. Clark had the necessary training, experience and 
familiarity with the theories of chiropractic treatment to allow her to give competent testimony 
about appropriate chiropractic care. Simply put, Dr. Clark does not have the credentials to 
allow her to testify about the chiropractic standard of care. In Chadwick v Nielsen, 763 P.2d 
817, 822 (Utah 1988) our Supreme Court said it is sound policy to limit expert testimony to 
that which is within the doctor's specific field of practice. In Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 
(Utah 1998) the plaintiff wanted her chiropractor to witness and comment on an IME being 
performed by a neurologist. The trial court told plaintiff she could take a neurologist to the 
examination, but not a chiropractor. On appeal, the Supreme Court held this was a correct 
ruling. It said: 
However, chiropractors and neurologists are trained in different fields. A chiropractor 
may be able to perform an independent examination, but is not qualified to evaluate 
a neurologist's performance. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
"[pjractitioners in one specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as experts on 
the standard of care applicable in another specialty." 956 P.2d at 1088-89 (citations 
omitted). 
If a chiropractor is not qualified to evaluate a neurologists performance, neither is a 
neurologist able to evaluate a chiropractors performance. The same would apply to a board 
certified practitioner of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. Astill, together with Burton 
v. Youngblood and its progeny, mandate that an M.D. cannot testify about chiropractic care 
absent specific training and experience regarding the theories of chiropractic medicine and 
their treatment applications. Dr. Clark does not have the background, experience or training 
in chiropractic theory and practice to allow her to give opinions on the issue of what is or is 
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not appropriate chiropractic care. Dr. Clark testified she does not practice using the 
chiropractic method, that chiropractic medicine uses a different theory of healing from her 
specialty, and that chiropractors treat their patients differently than would a general M.D. See, 
R. 775 at 70-74. 
Dr. Clark admitted she has little or no training in chiropractic medicine. She is not a 
licensed chiropractor. R. 775 at 70-73. She admitted at the time of her deposition that she had 
little, if any, familiarity with the CAD treatment protocols adopted by the Utah Chiropractic 
Association. R. 775 at 82-83. Surprisingly, at trial she claimed to have expertise on the 
application of these CAD treatment protocols. R. 775 at 56-58. She was then allowed to 
testify extensively that the treatment rendered by Dr. McClean was not appropriate and did 
not comply with CAD Protocols. R. 775 at 58-65. Such testimony lacked the foundation 
required by Burton v. Youngblood and its progeny. Moreover, it violated the prohibition set 
out in Dikeou v. Osborn that a doctor in one specialty can't be an expert and testify against 
a physician in a different specialty by reviewing medical records and reading up on the 
standard of care for that specialty. 
The admission of Dr. Clark's testimony is governed by Rule 702. Defendants must 
show that Dr. Clark has the background, training and experience in chiropractic medicine that 
would allow her to opine on the type and amount of chiropractic care rendered by Dr. 
McClean in this case. Arnold v. Curtis, supra; Astill v. Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
supra; Butterfield v. Okubo, supra; Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Martin v. Mott, supra. 
She did not have adequate foundational experience. R. 775 at 69-74, 81-92. 
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The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Clark to testify about the treatment 
given by Dr. McClean. 2?wrfotf v. Youngblood, supra; Dikeouv. Osborn, supra. Her testimony 
lacked an adequate foundation on the reasonableness and necessity of the care given by Dr. 
McClean; on the CAD Protocols and their application to the treatment of the Prunedas; and 
on the adequacy of the records kept by Dr. McClean. Id. See, Astill v. Clark, supra; 
Butterfieldv. Okubo, supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs did not get a fair trial. The courts of this State have, on occasion, 
observed that a party is not entitled to a perfect trial, but he is entitled to a fair one. E.g., State 
v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503 (Utah 1997); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990). 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a fair trial, if not a perfect one. This appears to be a basic principle 
of American law. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 
(1984). 
The Court denied plaintiffs the right to put on evidence to show Dr. McClean treated 
them for injuries received in the collision. The court required plaintiffs to redact Dr. 
McClean's medical records to remove all references to the fact he thought the injuries 
happened in the collision. The defense was allowed to produce unfounded medical evidence 
which told the jury Dr. McClean's treatment was excessive and unnecessary. Dr. France was 
allowed to opine on the impact speed of the Gray vehicle, without any foundation to establish 
that his opinion was more than a guess. Dr. Clark was allowed criticize the type and amount 
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of chiropractic care provided to plaintiffs by Dr. McClean without showing any knowledge 
of the chiropractic standard of care. 
The cumulative effect of these errors was a jury verdict that failed to award the 
plaintiffs expenses of treatment by Dr. McClean, and that failed to award general damages to 
Sergio Pruneda after he was awarded substantial damages for medical care. The trail court 
refused to follow clear Utah precedent to send the jury to deliberate further on a general 
damage award for Sergio Pruneda. 
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the verdict of the jury on general and 
special damages and remand this matter back to the trial court with instructions to grant 
plaintiffs' Motions in Limine regarding the testimony of Dr. France and Dr. Clark, and to 
deny the Motion in Limine of defendants regarding expert testimony of Dr. McClean, and 
with instructions to grant a new trial on damage issues only, with instruction to the jury that 
if it awards special damages of $3,000.00 or more, general damages, in more than a nominal 
amount, must be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of May, 2007. 
Mel. S. Martin, P.C. 
Edward T. Wells 7 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
23 
Certificate of Hand Delivery 
I certify that on the 11th day of May, 2007, I hand delivered two copies of 
Appellants' Reply Brief in the above matter to the following: 
Peter H. Christensen 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
3 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
24 
